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TRADEMARKS AND COMPETITION:
THE IVES CASE
VINCENT N. PALLADINO*
INTRODUCTION

Forty years after it last discussed trademark law,' the
Court will decide Darby Drug Co. v. Ives Laboratories,
Supreme
Inc. 2 (Ives). To many trademark attorneys, Ives already is
something of a landmark. 3 It is the aim of this article to show
* J.D., Columbia University 1975; B.A., Yale University 1972; member
New York State Bar; associate, Fish & Neave, New York City.
1. Certiorari was last granted in Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316
U.S. 203 (1942), "solely to review the provisions of the decree dealing with
the measure of profits and damages for the infringement found by the two
lower courts." Id. at 204-05. The case is best remembered today for Justice
Frankfurter's celebrated dictum concerning the "psychological function of
symbols." Id. at 205.
A more recent decision, Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714 (1967), involved the narrow question of the right to attorneys' fees
under § 35 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1117
(1976). In Fleischman, the Court ruled that fees were not available under
the Lanham Act. Thereafter, the statute was amended to provide that a
"court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party," and the significance of Fleischman was accordingly limited.
Two other decisions, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964), have
had a widespread influence on trademark law, although the cases focused
primarily on the relationship between state unfair competition law and federal patent policy. See generally Chapman, The Supreme Court and Federal
Law of Unfair Competition, 54 TMR 573 (1964); Cooper, Trademark Aspects
of PharmaceuticalProduct Design, 70 TMR 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Cooper]; Dannay, The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 67 TMR 132 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dannay]; Leeds,
The Impact of Sears and Compco, 55 TMR 188 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Leeds]; McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition
Law During the Decade of the 1970s, 71 TMR 93 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
McCarthy]; Note, Products Simulation" A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L.
REv. 1179 (1964).
2. Darby Drug Co. v. Ives Labs., Inc., No. 81-0011 consolidated with Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., No. 80-2182, cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. October 13, 1981). Ives involves the right of generic drug manufacturers to simulate the appearance of prescription drug capsules.
3. Others may well wonder why more trademark cases have not
reached the Supreme Court, and whether others may not be there soon.
For example, the decision in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531
F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976), focused attention on
the meaning of § 33(b) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b), an extremely
important section of the statute about which substantial controversy exists
in the trademark field. See Fletcher, IncontestabilityAnd Constructive No-
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why Ives is likely to be far more than an historical curiosity. No
effort will be made to anticipate the Supreme Court's decision,
to champion the views of any party, or to address every issue
raised in a host of briefs. Nor is this an occasion to consider only
5
pharmaceutical cases 4 and peculiar problems they may raise.

The substance 6 of trademark law involves five issues:
1. the Constitutional foundations;
2. the scope of trademark rights including the acquisition,
maintenance, and loss of those rights, federal registration, 7 and
tice: A Quarter Century of Adjudication, 63 TRM 71 (1973); McCarthy,
supra note 1, at 101-06.
There appears to be a widening division of authority concerning the
outer limits of the likelihood of confusion standard. Compare Warner Bros.,
Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); General Electric Co. v.
Alumpa Coal Co., Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D.Mass. 1979), with International
Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3931 (U.S. June 15, 1981); Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
The relationship between trademark law and the first amendment
presents an issue of potentially far reaching significance. See Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981); Kaul, First
Amendment Considerations, 1981 GENERIC TRADEMARKS 53 (PLI); McCar-

thy, supra note 1, at 112-23.
4. Recent cases that are closely related to Ives include SK&F Co. v.
Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980); Merrell-National
Labs. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q. 157 (D.N.J. 1977), affid on procedural
grounds, 579 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1978); Beecham, Inc. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., No.
81 Civ. 731 (D.N.J. October 22, 1981); Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v.
Pharmadyne Labs., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 1163 (D.N.J. 1980); Hoffman La Roche
v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 374 (D.N.J. 1980); A.H. Robins Co.
v. Medicine Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1015 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Pennwalt Corp.
v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Mich. 1979); and other cases cited
in Brief For The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association As Amicus Curiae at 25, Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., cert.granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 80-2182, 1980 Term; renumbered No. 81-11, 1981
Term).
5. One example of an issue peculiar to pharmaceutical cases is the relationship between trademark law and so-called generic drug substitution
laws. See generally Pharmaceutical Soc., Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 454 F. Supp.
1175, 1177-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 586 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1978); Note, Consumer Protection And PrescriptionDrugs: The Generic Drug Substitution
Laws, 67 KY. L.J. 384 (1979); and cases cited supra note 4.
6. A sixth issue is access to the courts and administrative tribunals.
However, even these questions may involve matters of substance, as where
a court decides that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), provides
a cause of action not previously recognized. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393, 406-09 (N.D. I1. 1979). See generally
Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act:
You've Come A Long Way, Baby-Too Far,Maybe?, 64 TMR 193 (1974). The
conduct of trademark disputes, whether in the courts or the Patent and
Trademark Office, makes procedure a seventh issue.
7. The time-honored rule that trademark rights arise solely out of use
should not obscure the substantive value of federal registration, including
the value of registration on the Principal Register, and the constructive notice provisions of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1065, 1115(b), 1072
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the relationship between trademarks and other branches of the
law;
3. infringement of trademark rights;
4. defenses to a charge of infringement;
5. remedies or relief.
The Constitutional issue has been settled since 1879.8 Many defenses are as much matters of scope 9 or infringement' ° as separate concerns, and relief ought to follow logically from rights"
and a finding of infringement.
The heart of trademark law is the scope of rights, and the
conditions under which they are violated. Those rights, in turn,
are inextricably bound up with the role trademarks play in a
competitive marketplace. Traditionally, concern with trademarks and competition has raised two broad issues. The first
issue is whether admittedly valid trademarks promote or restrain competition. 12 The second is the relationship between13
valid trademarks and generic terms or functional features.
Ives raises fundamental questions concerning the second of
these issues, and offers an opportunity to explore the bases of
trademark rights at a time when certain foundations of the law
may be starting to erode.
THE IVES CASE

In Ives Laboratories,Inc. v. Darby Drug Co. ,14 plaintiff made
cyclandelate, a prescription drug that it sold under the registered trademark CYCLOSPASMOL in pale blue 200 mg. cap(1976). See generally 1 J.

McMARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-

§ 16:2(A) at 569 n.16, § 19:5 at 659-61 (1973).
8. In Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), the Supreme Court decided
that Congressional power to regulate trademarks did not derive from Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution, which confers authority "to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts," but from the commerce clause of
the U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. For example, trademark rights may not be acquired in places occupied by an innocent prior user and may be lost through abandonment. 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2), (5) (1976).
10. The principal defense in many cases is that there is no infringement
because there is no likelihood of confusion. See, Vitarroz v. Borden, Inc.,
644 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1981). Admittedly not an aspect of infringement is the
defense of estoppel, which may operate to preclude relief despite a finding
of infringement. Even this defense will rarely justify permitting confusion
TION,

to go unchecked. Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 419 (1916).

11. For an example of how the scope of relief follows from the scope of
trademark rights, see infra text accompanying notes 97-100.

12. See authorities cited infra note 43.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 44-45.
14. 455 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (hereinafter cited as Ives I).
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sules and red-and-blue 400 mg. capsules. 15 The pale blue
capsules, but not the red-and-blue capsules, were introduced
during the term of a patent for cyclandelate that expired in
1972.16
After defendants began to promote the sale of the same
product' 7 in capsules of the same appearance, plaintiff sought to
enjoin defendants pendente lite from direct 18 and contributory 19
infringement of its registered trademark, 20 and violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.2 1 The district court ruled that one
15. Id. at 941.

16. This is not evident in Ives I, 455 F. Supp. 939, but may be found in
Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Ives 111.

17. For purposes of its preliminary injunction motion, plaintiff "conceded that the cyclandelate sold by defendants has the same bioavailability
as 'Cyclospasmol' and that the two are bioequivalent. . .

."

Ives I, 455 F.

Supp. at 942. It is suggested that this fact may distinguish Ives from cases
where a defendant's drug is not the equivalent of plaintiffs product. See
cases supra note 4. In the latter situation, it ought to be unnecessary to
decide whether the appearance of plaintiffs drug capsule identifies the
source of the drug or is associated with its ingredients and their therapeutic
effect. Even if the appearance is associated with the ingredients and their
therapeutic effect, a defendant who makes a nonequivalent drug should not
be entitled to duplicate the appearance of plaintiffs drug capsule to suggest
that it is the same product.
18. Plaintiff alleged that one wholesaler infringed its registered trademark by using the trademark SPASMOL, and the district court agreed. Ives
1, 455 F. Supp. at 943.
19. Plaintiff alleged that druggists infringed the registered CYCLOSPASMOL trademark by passing off defendants' drug, mislabeling bottles
given to customers or both, and that defendants contributed to this infringement by simulating the appearance of CYCLOSPASMOL capsules and distributing certain catalogs. Ives I, 455 F. Supp. at 942, 945-46.
20. Section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1976),
provides:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant.., use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of
a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.., shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
21. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976) provides:
Any person who shall afflx, apply, or annex, or use in connection
with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a
false designation of origin, or any false description or representation,
including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such
designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure
the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to
any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by
any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of
origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.
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defendant's use of SPASMOL was a direct infringement of
23
22
CYCLOSPASMOL, but otherwise denied relief.
On appeal, 24 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction on the ground that
it did not constitute an abuse of discretion.2 5 At the same time,
it corrected several errors of law committed by the district court.
These included the lower court's statement of the test for contributory trademark infringement, 26 and its assessment of the
effect of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions in Sears,Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co. and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,

Inc.27
After a full trial on the merits, 28 the district court again
found an absence of either contributory trademark infringement 29 or a violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Disagreeing with the district court's decision on contributory
trademark infringement, the Second Circuit reversed3 0 without
directly considering whether a violation of Section 43(a) had occurred. 3 ' On remand, the district court permanently enjoined
defendants from simulating the appearance of plaintiff's drug
32
capsules.
THE ISSUES IN PERSPECTIVE
As is demonstrated by five judicial opinions and twenty
briefs submitted to the Supreme Court,33 Ives raises a host of
In Ives I, plaintiff alleged that defendants' simulation of the appearance of
its CYCLOSPASMOL capsules violated this section of the statute. Ives I,
455 F. Supp. at 942, 946-51. In addition, plaintiff argued that this simulation
amounted to placing an instrument of fraud in the hands of druggists in
violation of New York common and statutory law. Id. at 942, 951. This aspect of the case will not be considered further in this article.
22. See supra note 18.
23. Ives I, 455 F. Supp. at 952.
24. Ives 11, 601 F.2d 631.
25. Id. at 644.
26. Id. at 636.
27. Id. at 639-44. Sears and Compco are discussed supra note 1.

28. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Ives III].
29. Concerning direct infringement, the district court held that there
was "no reason why the temporary injunction against Sherry prohibiting
use of the name 'Spasmol' should not be made permanent." Id. at 397.
30. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Ives IV].
31. Id. at 545 n.1. For a discussion of how the Second Circuit may have
addressed this issue indirectly, see infra note 99.
32. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., No. 78 Civ. 372 (S.D.N.Y. May 15,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Ives V1.
33. Seven briefs, including two briefs amicus curiae,were ified with the
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issues. 34 From a somewhat bewildering array, two questions
stand out: (1) the scope of trademark rights in light of Sears and

Compco 35 and Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.;36 (2) the

37
scope of the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement.
These concerns transcend the facts of Ives and are best understood against the background of fundamental principles of
trademark law.

The TraditionalFoundationsof Trademark Rights
A trademark is any "word, name, symbol, or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those
manufactured or sold by others. '38 So called "arbitrary" and
"suggestive" words, names, symbols and devices 39 are said to be

valid trademarks when first used because they identify the
source of goods at that time.4° "Descriptive" words, names, symSupreme Court in connection with the petition for a writ of certiorari. On
the merits, twelve briefs were filed including eight briefs amicus curiae.
34. See supra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 1.
36. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 19, 26, 30.
38. Section 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976). Accord Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). It is suggested that this definition, and
the reference to any "symbol, or device" in particular, is broad enough to
encompass packaging and product features that are frequently referred to
as trade dress. Compare, e.g., Ives 11, 601 F.2d at 643-44 (referring to the
appearance of plaintiff's drug capsule as "trade dress") with Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir.
1979):
It is well established that, if the design of an item is nonfunctional and
has acquired secondary meaning, the design may become a trademark
even if the item itself is functional. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby
Drug. Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642 (2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equipment Service Co.
v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.), cert.denied, 429 U.S. 861,
97 S.Ct. 164, 50 L.Ed.2d 139 (1976). (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
39. The terms "arbitrary" and "suggestive" are most commonly used in
connection with words and names. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1976). However, these terms
are equally applicable to symbols and devices. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979)
(arbitrary); Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 1055,
1060 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (suggestive). Cf. Ives IV, 638 F.2d at 540, (Second Circuit characterized the appearance of plaintiff's drug capsules as "distinctive,"). See discussion infra note 99.
40. Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 n.8 (1st Cir.
1980); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental
Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 1979); Miller Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978); Abercrombie &Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10-11
(2d Cir. 1976).
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bols or devices are not accorded trademark status until they acquire "secondary meaning" 4 1 and, thereby, identify the source
of goods. 42
From these basic principles, it is said to follow that trademarks "are the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer
to distinguish one from the other."43 Where competition will be
41. The majority view is that secondary meaning is an association between a product and its source. Harlequin Enterprises Ltd. v. Gulf &Western Corp., 503 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.

1981); American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3,12
(5th Cir. 1974); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794,

802 (9th Cir. 1970) ("Secondary meaning has been defined as association,
nothing more.") (original emphasis).
At least where product features are involved, some cases have applied
the two-pronged definition of secondary meaning set out by Learned Hand
in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917):
[P] laintiff [must] show [11 that the appearance of his wares has in fact
come to mean that some particular person-the plaintiff may not be individually known-makes them, and [21 that the public cares who does
make them, and not merely for their appearance and structure.
Id. at 300.
See Astatic Corp. v. American Elect., Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 411,419-20 (N.D. Ohio
1978, as amended 1979); American Basketball Assoc. v. AMF Voit, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 981, 986 (S.D.N.Y.), afOd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
670, 686-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); W. E. Bassett Co. v. H. C. Cook Co., 164 F. Supp.
278, 283 (D. Conn. 1958).
Whether this second requirement is reasonable may be explored by examining the other side of the question: the meaning of generic character.
In Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448,453
(N.D. Cal. 1981), the court observed that the test for genericness "requires a
determination of 'primary significance' of the mark 'MONOPOLY' in the average consumer's mind. It does not seek an explanation of an actual purchaser's motivation for purchasing the game." (original emphasis).
Requiring a showing on the latter point "proves" that trademarks such as
TIDE are generic terms. Id. at 453-54 n.5.
42. See cases cited supra note 40. Although the source of the analysis at
notes 39-42, supra, is a case of recent origin, this approach reflects traditional notions of trademark rights. See generally 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note

7, § 11.

43. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS 1274, 1274-75, citing Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co.,
316 U.S. 203, 204-05; Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924); United
Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918); Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879). This has long represented the majority view. See Palladino,
Compulsory Licensing Of A Trademark, 26 BuFF. L. REV. 457, 475 nn.91, 11214 (1977).
The contrary view, that valid trademarks are anticompetitive monopolies, can be found in authorities such as CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MOCONG.

NOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

(8th ed. 1962); Timberg, Trademarks, Monopoly,

and the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 323, 324-27
(1949), and the opinions of Judge Jerome Frank in Triangle Publications,
Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 974-83 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting);
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impeded by the exclusive appropriation of a word, name, symbol
or device, these are denied the status of valid trademarks. A
word or name in this category is considered generic, 44 whereas
a
45
symbol or device of this type is regarded as functional.
The Scope of Trademark Rights
Sears and Compco
At least as early as Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop
Co.,46 it was established that one could claim exclusive rights in
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37-43 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J.,
concurring); Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 95758 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943).
As a fixed point inan ever-changing commercial universe, a trademark
represents the quality of goods, and serves as a focus of advertising. See
e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296, 301
(9th Cir. 1979); Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function Of Trademarks, 43
FoRDHAM L. REv. 363 (1974). See generally Palladino, supra note 43 at 47277.

44. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 U.S. 311, 323 (1871); Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1981); Anti-monopoly, Inc. v.
General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1979); Miller
Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Abercrombie &Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,
537 F.2d 4,9-10 (2d Cir. 1976); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Park &Fly, Inc., 489 F. Supp.
422, 425 (D. Mass. 1979); Salton Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F. Supp. 975, 986
(D.N.J. 1979); Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 445 (D.
Ore. 1978).
The Lanham Act does not use the word "generic". The statute provides
that the right of a registrant to use a trademark may be made incontestable
by the filing of an appropriate affidavit, but that "no incontestable right
shall be acquired in a mark which is the common descriptive name of any
article or substance, patented or otherwise." 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (1976). It
also provides that after five years a registration may no longer be canceled
except on one of several grounds, including that the mark has become the
"common descriptive name" of an article or substance. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c)
(1976). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1976).
45. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981);
International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg &Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3931 (U.S. June 15, 1981) (involving
name as well as symbol); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works,
Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equip. Serv.
Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 861 (1976); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (D.
Hawaii 1979), affd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); Fotomat Corp. v. Photo
Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693, 705 (D.N.J. 1977); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), affid per
curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972). Cf.Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz,
Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (involving name). See also Vuitton et Fils S-A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981)
("LV" for luggage and handbags); Trak, Inc. v. Banner Ski KG, 475 F. Supp.
1076, 1082 (D. Mass. 1979) (refusing to analyze "flshscale" as if it were a
symbol or device).
46. 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917). For a discussion of the antecedents of Crescent Tool, including Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary &Clark, 131 F. 240
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the nonfunctional features of a product, provided the features
were distinctive, viz., had acquired secondary meaning.47 Thus,
features of a product were treated "like [the product's] descriptive title in true cases of 'secondary' meaning."' '
In 1964, the Supreme Court decided Sears and Compco.

49

In

Sears, the Court held that defendant could not be enjoined from
making and selling a pole lamp that closely resembled plaintiff's
lamp, and observed:
Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the
objectives of the federal patent laws.
In the present case the 'pole lamp' sold by Stiffel has been held
not to be entitled to the protection of either a mechanical or a design patent. An unpatentable article, like an article on which the
patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be made and
sold by whoever chooses to do so. What Sears did was to copy Stiffel's design and to sell lamps almost identical to those sold by Stif50
fel. This it had every right to do under the federal patent laws.

Compco involved a fluorescent lighting fixture, which the
Court held could be copied. The Court reached this result despite indications that certain ribbing on plaintiffs fixture was
nonfunctional 5 l and evidence that the "fixture identified DayBrite to the trade because the arrangement of the ribbing had,
like a trademark, acquired a 'secondary meaning' by which that
particular design was associated with Day-Brite. ''5 2 Explaining
its decision, the Court stated:

(2d Cir.. 1904), see 1 H. NiMs, UNFAm COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS
§§ 134a-136 at 378-85 (4th ed. 1947). See also Note, Unfair Competition And
The Doctrine Of Functionality, 64 COLUM. L REV. 544, 549-51 (1964). That
the doctrine was well recognized is evident from its codification in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 741 (1938).
Similarly, it was said in an early case involving prescription drugs,
Upjohn Co. v. Win. S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 F. 209 (6th Cir. 1920), cert.
denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1921): "[T]he existence of a secondary meaning or an
identification coming from appearance is sufficient [to warrant relief]." Id.
at 213. Accord Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Broder, 125 U.S.P.Q. 299, 30203 (S.D. Tex. 1959); Smith, Kline &French Labs. v. Heart Pharm. Corp., 90 F.

Supp. 976, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).

47. For a discussion of product features that are inherently distinctive,
see supra note 39.

48. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn &Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir.
1917). One difference between symbols or features and words or names is
the need to establish two elements (nonfunctionality and distinctiveness)
in the case of symbols or features, as opposed to one element (distinctiveness) in the case of words or names. See infra note 183.
49. See supra note 1.

50. 376 U.S. at 231.
51. Id. at 236 ("Although the District Court had not made such a finding,
the appellate court observed that 'several choices of ribbing were apparently available to meet the functional needs of the product'...
52. Id. at 238.
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That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in
some other way, that the design is 'nonfunctional' and not essential
to the use of either article, that the configuration of the article copied may have a 'secondary meaning' which identifies the maker to
the trade, or that there may be 'confusion' among purchasers as to
which article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant
evidence in applying a State's law requiring such precautions as
labeling; however, and regardless of the copier's motives, neither
these facts nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing
5 3 liability
for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.
For about a decade after they were decided, Sears and
Compco "generated a great deal of controversy"5 4 concerning
the viability of the Crescent Tool doctrine, including its application in pharmaceutical cases.5 5

As one commentator summa-

rized the views of many in the trademark field: "After SearsCompco, it was believed that if the product shape did not meet
federal patent requirements (or did not have other federal statu56
tory protection) competitors had the right to make copies.1
Beginning with cases such as Truck Equipment Service Co.
v. FruehaufCorp.,5 courts again recognized exclusive rights in
the distinctive nonfunctional features of products without hesitation. 58 Recent prescription pharmaceutical cases are among
53. Id.

54. Le Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602, 605
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See articles cited supra note 1.
55. Compare Marion Labs., Inc. v. Michigan Pharmacal Corp., 338 F.
Supp. 762, 768-69 (E.D. Mich. 1972), ajf'd mem., 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973)
with McMurray, Drug Product Imitation As Unfair Competition, 26 Bus.
LAw. 339, 344-46 (1970).

56. Dannay, supra note 1, at 143. Compare McCarthy, supra note 1, at
96; Cooper, supra note 1, at 17 with Leeds, supra note 1. This issue was
before the Second Circuit in Ives II, 601 F.2d at 639-41, and has been raised
in briefs filed with the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, at 8-9,
21 n.13, Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 80-2182, 1980 Term; renumbered No. 81-11, 1981
Term) [hereinafter cited as Premo Brief]; Brief for Respondent, at 20-24,
Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct.
13, 1981) (No. 80-2182, 1980 Term; renumbered No. 81-11, 1981 Term) [hereinafter cited as Darby Brief].
57. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
58. Cases include those in which the size and shape of a product was at
issue. See, e.g., Tveter v. A.B. Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.,
536 F.2d 1210, 1214, 1217-20 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); RollsRoyce Motors Ltd. v. A &A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692 (N.D. Ga.
1976, as amended 1977); Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F.
Supp. 905, 909-11 (D.N.J. 1976). See also Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc.,
653 F.2d 822, 823 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981) (relief denied where features were functional); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602, 606
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (relief denied where features had not acquired secondary
meaning). Where color was added as a third element, the treatment has
been the same. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
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these decisions. 59 Several courts have circumvented Sears and
Compco by noting that "one area that unquestionably survived
was the state's power to prohibit 'palming off'," 60 and leaving to
others the case where palming offtl is not involved. Also incomplete is the explanation that Sears and Compco present no bar
to an action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act because
there is "no conflict with federal statutory policy. '62 This approach calls into question the viability of Crescent Tool, a case
in view of
decided at common law, and is particularly anomolous
63
the common law character of trademark rights.
Others have suggested that Sears and Compco present no
bar to the enforcement of trademark rights, because the Court
was discussing the relationship between state unfair competition law and federal patent policy:
In Sears-Compco the Court held merely that a state may not,
through its law banning unfair competition, undermine the federal
patent laws by prohibiting the copying of an article that is protected by neither a federal patent nor a federal copyright. For the
Court to have held otherwise would have been to allow states to
grant a monopoly to a producer where the federal government had
specifically determined that free competition should prevail. This
consideration does not apply in a trademark infringement action
where the plaintiff does not assert exclusive rights to the sale of a
product but merely to a mark indicating its origin or sponsorship.
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Windmere
Prods., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 710, 736 (S.D. Fla. 1977). See also T &T Mfg. Co. v.
A. T. Cross Co., 449 F. Supp. 813, 817 (D.R.I. 1978), affd, 587 F.2d 533 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979).
59. See cases cited supra note 4, including A.H. Robins Co. v. Medicine
Chest Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1015, 1020 (E.D. Mo. 1980):
Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 140 U.S.P.Q. 524
(1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234, 140
U.S.P.Q. 528 (1964), do not preclude relief in this case. This opinion
may not be construed to grant plaintiff a monopoly in the color blue or
to grant plaintiff a patent monopoly.
60. Tveter v. A.B. Turn-o-matic, 633 F.2d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Pennwalt Corp. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 472 F. Supp.
413, 418 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Windmere Prods., Inc.,
433 F. Supp. 710, 736 (S.D. Fla. 1977). See SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs.,
Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1064 (3d Cir. 1980); Dannay, supra note 1, at 143.
61. Although the term is not infrequently misused, palming off, or passing off, is generally understood to be a mere species of trademark infringement or unfair competition and as such will not occur in many cases where
a likelihood of confusion would justify relief. See generally 2 McCARTHY,
supra note 7, § 25:1 at 169-74.
62. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc.,
478 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs.,
Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980); Dannay, supra note 1, at 144.
63. In a system where trademark rights are said to arise out of use, and
are enforceable in the absence of a federal registration, it is anomalous to
create a class of trademarks that are enforceable only under federal statutory law. See supra note 7.
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The question presented therefore is one of trademark law, and it is
clear that Sears-Compco did not redefine the permissible scope of
the law of trademarks insofar as it applies to origin and
sponsorship. 64

This may well be true of Sears, where the Court did not consider whether or not features of plaintiff's pole lamp were functional or had acquired secondary meaning. It seems more
difficult to read trademarks out of Compco, which not only mentioned them but involved a possibly nonfunctional feature with

secondary meaning. 65 That the Compco Court was considering
unfair competition, not trademark rights, is unclear. And the
difference may be more a matter of semantics than substance,

where the only trademark plaintiff could have claimed was a
66
nonfunctional feature with secondary meaning.

If symbol and device trademarks survived Compco, 67 it is
not because the Court neglected to mention "trademarks. ' 68

Their continued existence, it is suggested, follows from the
Court's failure to consider the competitive implications of its decision. In ruling that defendant had the right "to copy whatever

the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain, ' 69 including, quite possibly, a nonfunctional 70 product fea-

ture with secondary meaning, 7 1 the Court never considered the
competitive balance that the trademark law has struck. 72 Until
the Court does so, Compco ought not to be read to mean that
64. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Accord Rolls-Royce Motors,
Ltd. v. A&A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Time
Mechanisms, Inc., v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D.N.J. 1976). See
also SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980);
Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Labs., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.
1163, 1182 (D.N.J. 1980); McCarthy, supra note 1, at 96 n.7. ("[Ljanguage in
Sears-Compco to the effect that if an item is unprotected by patent law, it is
therefore in the public domain, is a non sequitur. That a thing is unpatented does not mean that its duplication or imitation cannot be remedied by
other sources of intellectual property law, such as copyright, trademark or
general unfair competition."); Cooper, supra note 1, at 17 n.64; Leeds, supra
note 1, at 189-91.
65. See supra text and quotes accompanying notes 51-53.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
67. If symbol and device trademarks have not survived Compco, the
case creates the peculiar situation in which some types of trademarks
(symbols and devices) are entitled to less protection than others (words
and names). See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
68. See supra quote accompanying note 52.
69. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
70. See supra text and quotes accompanying notes 51, 53.
71. See supra textual quote accompanying note 52.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45. Cf. Truck Equip. Serv. Co.
v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1976).

19821

Trademarks and Competition

competition can only be promoted by granting free access to
whatever is not patented or copyrighted.

The "Shredded Wheat" Case
In one of its last considerations of trademark law, 73 the
Supreme Court decided Kellogg Co. v. NationalBiscuit Co. 74 In
that case plaintiff owned a patent on a machine that produced
whole wheat cereal. After the patent expired, plaintiff's competitors began to make "shredded wheat" in pillow shaped biscuits.
Claiming exclusive rights in the words "shredded wheat" and
the pillow shape, plaintiff brought suit.
In reversing the award of an injunction, the Court found
that the words "shredded wheat" were generic:
The plaintiff has no exclusive right to the use of the term 'Shredded
Wheat' as a trade name. For that is the generic term of the article,
which describes it with a fair degree of accuracy; and is the term by
which the biscuit in pillow-shaped form is generally known by the
public. Since the term is generic, the 75original maker of the product
acquired no exclusive right to use it.
and that the pillow shape was functional:
The plaintiff has not the exclusive right to sell shredded wheat in
the form of a pillow-shaped biscuit-the form in which the article
became known to the public. That is the form in which shredded
wheat was made under the basic patent. The patented machines
used were designed to produce only the pillow-shaped biscuits.
The evidence is persuasive that this form is functional-that the
cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high quality 76
lessened
if some other form were substituted for the pillow-shape.
Since Kellogg was decided, numerous trademark infringement actions have been defended on the ground that plaintiff's
word mark "names the article of the now-expired patent, and
that the monopoly in the name expired with patent, '7 7 together
with the monopoly over features of the product. 78 Ives is the lat79
est example of this practice.
73. See supra note 1.

74. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
75. Id. at 116.
76. Id. at 119-22.
77. Chas. Pfizer &Co. v. Generic Formulae, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 421, 423
(E.D.N.Y. 1967). Accord Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903, 907
(3d Cir. 1952); Riverbank Labs. v. Hardwood Prods. Corp., 165 F. Supp. 747,
762 (N.D.Ill. 1958). See also cases cited infra note 80.
78. Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Windmere Prods., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 710, 738
(S.D. Fla. 1977) ("Defendant argues that such features as the overall shape
of the units are indisputably functional ...

").

See also cases cited infra

note 84.
79. The view that the CYCLOSPASMOL trademark is generic is
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That Kellogg never established so broad a rule cannot seriously be doubted:
There is no rule that a trademark for a patented article ceases to be
a trade-mark on the expiration of the patent ....

It is not by the

expiration of the patent... but by the change of meaning in the
market, that such a designation ceases to be a trademark .... 80
presented in the Brief For The Generic Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association As Amicus Curiae at 13-17, Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 80-2182, 1980 Term; renumbered No. 81-11, 1981 Term). Perhaps because the record below is barren on this point, the argument is a legal one. Cf Brief For The Respondent
at 29-30, Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 80-2182, 1980 Term; renumbered No. 81-11, 1981
Term).
The position that Kellogg precludes Ives Laboratories from exclusively
appropriating the appearance of its pale blue CYCLOSPASMOL capsules is
most clearly presented in Premo Brief, supra note 56, at 27-29. This, too, is a
legal argument, based on assumption rather than evidence:
Because cyclandelate capsules originated with respondent and no
other manufacturer during the term of the patent, it is logical to assume
that consumers may have associated the pale blue color of the product
with a capsule containing CYCLOSPASMOL brand cyclandelate, solely
because those were the only cyclandelate capsules availableon the market and prescribedto patients. Thus, even if respondent had been able

to establish at trial that the appearance of its 200 mg. product was associated by the public with CYCLOSPASMOL brand cyclandelate, the
holding of this Court in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111
(1938) would bar the granting of relief to respondent against the copying of that appearance. (Premo Brief, supra note 56, at 27) (original
emphasis)
Cf. Brief For The Respondent at 30, Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 80-2182, 1980 Term; renumbered No. 81-11, 1981 Term).
Other briefs are less scrupulous in distinguishing between the pale
blue CYCLOSPASMOL capsules, introduced during the term of the cyclandelate patent, and the blue-and-red CYCLOSPASMOL capsules that
were not made available until after the patent had expired. See, e.g., Darby
Brief, supra note 56, at 16, 19.
80. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 735 (1938), comment b. Accord Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Heraeus Engelhard Vacuum, Inc., 395 F.2d 457,-461-62 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968); Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d
903, 907 (3d Cir. 1952); Enders Razor Co. v. Christy Co., 85 F.2d 195, 197 (6th
Cir. 1936); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); President Suspender Co. v. MacWilliam, 238 F. 159, 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 636 (1916); Riverbanks
Labs. v. Hardwood Prods. Corp., 165 F. Supp. 747, 762-63 (N.D. Ill. 1958);
Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 271 (D. Mass. 1955), affd, 237 F.2d
428 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957); Medd v. Boyd Wagner,
Inc., 132 F. Supp. 399, 409 (N.D. Ohio 1955); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson &Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952), aftd, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.), modified
on other grounds,207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).

Drug cases applying this rule include Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith
Kline &French Lab., 207 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir. 1953); Chas. Pfizer & Co. v.
Generic Formulae, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 421, 423 (E.D. N.Y. 1967) ('The name,
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After the expiration of a patent, the "single question .. .is
merely one of fact: What do the buyers understand by the word
for whose use the parties are contending?" 8'
Similarly, functional features are the only elements of a
product that are dedicated to the public when a patent expires.
This is evident from Kellogg itself,82 and other cases. For example, in Teledyne Industries,Inc. v. Windmere Products,Inc. ,83 the
court distinguished between certain functional features recited
in the patents for a shower head and "the color scheme and lettering size and style... [which] are nonfunctional, nonesthetic
84
features that serve only to indicate origin."
This treatment of generic terms and functional features
after Kellogg is an application of the traditional balance between valid trademarks on the one hand and generic terms or
functional features on the other. Where a word, name, symbol
or device identifies the source of a once-patented product, and is
not generic or functional, it may be appropriated by that single
source. Where a word name, symbol or device does not identify
source, or is generic or functional, it may be used by others.
Contributory Trademark Infringement
It is well settled that one can be found liable for contributing to another's infringement of a trademark. 85 Although the reeven if embarrassed by its complete coincidence with all lawful sales of the
patented product, may still identify a specific source to a significant class of
users and be entitled to protection to that extent at least."); Bayer Co. v.
United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
81. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
82. See supra quote accompanying note 76.
83. 433 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.Fla. 1977).
84. Id. at 738. See also cases cited supra note 4, where defendants were
enjoined from simulating the appearance of drug capsules and tablets that
contained ingredients covered by patents. Cf. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1219 n.12 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976); Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 913
(D.N.J. 1976).
85. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1924);
Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 253 F.2d 568, 575 (8th
Cir. 1958); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254,259 (2d Cir. 1957); Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. H. P. Coffee Co., 48 F.2d 817, 819-20 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 621 (1931); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 745 (D.
Hawaii 1979), affd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v.
Windmere Prods. Inc., 433 F. Supp. 710, 737 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Scotch Whiskey
1971), aff'd in
Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595, 599 (N.D. Ill.
part, rev'd on other grounds, 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973); Wurzburger Hofbrau A.G. v. Schoenling Brewing Co., 331 F. Supp. 497, 506 (S.D. Ohio 1971),
affid per curiam, 175 U.S.P.Q. 391 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972); Coming Glass Works v. Jeannette Glass Co., 308 F. Supp. 1321, 1326
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd per curiam, 432 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1970); Stix Products,
Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
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lationship between the contributory and direct infringer
varies,8 6 the former is generally a manufacturer of goods who
performs some act that contributes to infringement by a retailer
87
or wholesaler.
The test for contributory infringement is well established:
Before he can himself be held as a wrongdoer or contributory infringer one who supplies another with the instruments by which
that other commits a tort, must be shown to have knowledge that
the other will or can reasonably be expected to commit a tort with
the supplied instrument ....

The test is whether wrongdoing by

the purchaser
'might well have been anticipated by the
88
defendant.'
Acts that violate this standard include: directly suggesting
the substitution of defendant's product for plaintiff's; 89 suggesting the substitution by pointing out the similarity between
products and the difference in price; 90 affixing to defendant's
goods a trademark confusingly similar to plaintiff's trademark; 91
Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass.
1946), affd, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809.
86. See, e.g., Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F.

Supp. 479, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("Not only did Firestone process the product
which contained the infringing term, it also actively aided, abetted and furthered Stix's entire advertising and promotional campaign in the use of
'contact' and its invasion of United's trade-mark rights.").

87. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924);
Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 253 F.2d 568, 571 (8th
Cir. 1958); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1957); Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. H.P. Coffee Co., 48 F.2d 817 (8th), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 621
(1931); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 746 (D. Hawaii
1979); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Windmere Prods., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 710, 737
(S.D. Fla. 1977); Scotch Wiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 388 F. Supp.
595, 599 (N.D. Ill.
1971), affd in part, rev'd in part, 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.
1973); Wurzburger Hofbrau A.G. v. Schoenling Brewing Co., 331 F. Supp.
497, 506 (S.D. Ohio 1971), affd per curiam, 175 U.S.P.Q. 391 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Corning Glass Works v. Jeanette Glass Co., 308
F. Supp. 1321, 1326-27 (S.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam,432 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1970);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Snowcrest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass
1946), affid, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947).
88. Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D.
Mass. 1946), affid, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947). See
also cases cited supra note 85.
89. William R.Warner &Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924);
Corning Glass Works v. Jeanette Glass Co., 308 F. Supp. 1321, 1327
(S.D.N.Y.), afd per curiam, 432 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1970); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Snowcrest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass. 1946), affd, 162

F.2d 280 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947).
90. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924);
Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1957). See cases cited
supra note 4.
91. Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 253 F.2d 568,
573-74 (8th Cir. 1958); Reid, Murdoch &Co. v. H.P. Coffee Co., 48 F.2d 817, 819
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 621 (1931); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v.

Windmere Prods., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 710, 738 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (copying of
'nonfunctional features that serve only to identify."); Scotch Whiskey Ass'n
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and continuing to sell to others with knowledge that they are
violating plaintiff's rights.9 2 Frequently, more than one act is involved in conduct that contributes to infringement, 93 and a question may arise as to the scope of relief.9
Ives brings the contributory infringement doctrine into
sharp focus. In Ives IV, the Second Circuit found that druggists
infringed the CYCLOSPASMOL trademark by passing off, mislabeling or both, and that certain defendants contributed to this
infringement by "using capsules of identical color, size and
shape, together with a catalog describing their appearance and
listing comparative prices of CYCLOSPASMOL and generic
cyclandelate. ' 9 5 Special attention has been focused on this ruling because the Second Circuit did not directly consider alterna96
tive theories of relief.
Beyond the concern which this approach has evoked, 97 the
issue is simply the scope of relief to which the doctrine of contributory infringement gives rise. The scope of relief follows directly from a proper understanding of the scope of trademark
rights. Although several acts taken together may contribute to
trademark infringement, 98 a party ought not to be enjoined from
acts that standing alone would be entirely lawful, 99 unless a
v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595, 599 (N.D. Il. 1971), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973); Wurzburger Hofbrau A.G. v.
Schoenling Brewing Co., 331 F. Supp. 497, 506 (S.D. Ohio 1971), affd per
curiam, 175 U.S.P.Q. 391 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Corning Glass Works v. Jeanette Glass Co., 308 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd per curiam, 432 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1970); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United
Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
92. Coca-Cola Co. v. Snowcrest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D.
Mass. 1946), affd, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947).
93. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924);
Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 253 F.2d 568, 573-74
(8th Cir. 1958); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1957); Corning Glass Works v. Jeanette Glass Co., 308 F. Supp. 1321, 1326-27 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd per curiam, 432 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1970). See also cases cited supra note
4.
94. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1924);
Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 253 F.2d 568, 573-74
(8th Cir. 1958); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1957).
95. Ives IV, 638 F.2d at 543.
96. See infra note 99 and text accompanying note 31.
97. See briefs referred to supra note 33.
98. See cases cited supra note 93.
99. William R.Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1924);
Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254,261-62 (2d Cir. 1957). Where, as in Ives,
the contributory conduct consists of product simulation and advertising,
this approach would indicate that the product simulation ought not to be
enjoined unless it would be a violation of trademark rights. This is not to
suggest that such a showing was not made in Ives. On the contrary, the
Second Circuit considered the appearance of the CYCLOSPASMOL capsules non-functional. Ives IV, 638 F.2d at 544. It also characterized the ap-
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judgment is made to place defendant in a worse position than a
competitor who has not engaged in an infringing course of
conduct. 100
The decision to treat a contributory infringer differently
from an honest competitor ought to involve a balancing of
(1) the deterent effect of punishing a wrongdoer in the interests
of promoting fair competition against (2) the reduction in competition that such an injunction will cause. For example, assume that defendant grows coffee beans and sells them in
competition with FAMOUS BRAND coffee. A brochure that accompanies defendant's coffee beans reads:
Our coffee is cheaper than FAMOUS BRAND coffee. Substitute it
whenever you receive an order for FAMOUS BRAND coffee, and
pocket the profit.
Retailers adopt defendant's suggestion.
Defendant has concededly contributed to the infringement
of the FAMOUS BRAND trademark by selling a product apparently indistinguishable from plaintiff's and suggesting that it be
substituted for plaintiff's product. Because plaintiff cannot
show that its coffee beans possess a distinctive nonfunctional
pearance of the capsules as "distinctive," id. at 540, and found that
petitioners "intentionally chose to use gelatin capsules which were identical in color, shape, and size to those used by Ives even though scores of
other colors, color combinations, and sizes were available." Id. at 540. Such
copying, unjustified by functional considerations, has been held to establish
"beyond doubt that the trade dress reflects the brand and the origin rather
than the medication itself." SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 481 F.
Supp. 1184, 1189 (1979). Accord Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v.
Pharmadyne Labs., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 1163, 1184 (D.N.J. 1980); E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. 545, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

See also Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1220 n.13
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Fremont Co. v. 1IT Continental
Baking Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 415, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
100. Sometimes an adjudged infringer is prohibited from using a new
trademark that would not be considered an infringement if used by an innocent party. See, e.g., Independent Nail & Pack. Co. v. Stronghold Screw
Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1954); Dawn Assoc. v. Links, 203
U.S.P.Q. 831,836 (N.D.Ill. 1978); Kimberly Knitwear, Inc. v. Kimberly Stores,
Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1339, 1340-42 (W.D.Mich. 1971). See also AMF Inc. v. International Fiberglass Co., 469 F.2d 1063, 1065 (1st Cir. 1972); Eskay Drugs, Inc.
v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 188 F.2d 430, 432 (5th Cir. 1951); Aurora
Prods. Corp. v. Schisgall Enterprises, Inc., 176 U.S.P.Q. 184, 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). Cf. Brief For The Respondent at 51-52, Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug
Co., cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 80-2182, 1980

Term; renumbered No. 81-11, 1981 Term) urging that secondary meaning
need not be shown under the New York law of unfair competition. The
court may have had this rationale in mind when it enjoined defendant from
using plaintiff's color names and code numbers, although these were not
shown to have acquired secondary meaning. In that case, defendant was a
former dealer of plaintiff who was attempting "to hold onto the merchandising advantage, which it had consentedly been permitted to enjoy in that

Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib. Co.,
relationship ....
253 F.2d 568, 574 (8th Cir. 1958).
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feature, defendant should only be enjoined from making the offending statements that appear in its brochure, unless it is believed that deterring defendant and others from making similar
statements justifies enjoining defendant from selling coffee in
competition with plaintiff, or requiring defendant to take steps
that may reduce its ability to compete.
BEHIND THE ISSUES: TRADEMARKS AND COMPETITION

Underlying the issues raised in Ives are certain fundamental questions concerning trademarks and competition.
The Definition of a Trademark
There is little in the trademark law as basic as the definition
of a trademark: any word, name, symbol or device or combination thereof that identifies the goods of one party and distinguishes them from those of others. 10 1 Nonetheless, this
definition may be overly broad, and assumes a relationship between valid trademarks and designations 10 2 in the public domain that does not exist.
The accepted definition of a trademark assumes that any
designation may be classified as a trademark on the one hand,
and a generic term or functional feature on the other, and that
these two categories are mutually exclusive; whereas a trademark furthers competition by identifying a single source, 10 3 a generic term or functional feature does so when it is available to
l 4
others.1
In fact, the law recognizes three classes of designations, not
two. These include:
1. a valid trademark;
2. a word, name, symbol or devices that exhibits the qualities
of both a trademark and a generic term or functional feature; and
3. a generic term or functional feature.
That the law has conceded the existence of designations in
the second category is evident from the doctrine of defacto secondary meaning in generic terms' 0 5 and functional features' 0 6
101. See authorities cited supra note 38.
102. The term "designation" is used in this article to mean a word, name,
symbol or device.
103. See authorities cited supra note 43.
104. See cases cited supra notes 44-45.
105. This is the doctrine that "'no matter how much money and effort the
user of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public identification, it
cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call
an article by its name."' Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,
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and the primary significance test as it is applied to words and
names 10 7 and symbols and devices. 10 8 Given such intermediate
537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (citation omitted; emphasis added). Accord
Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 655 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1981)'; Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 (1st Cir. 1980); Reese Publishing Co. v. Hampton Int'l Communications, Inc., 620 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980);
Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1980); Surgicenters
of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir.
1979); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heiliman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 77 (7th
Cir. 1977); CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11,
13-14 (2d Cir. 1975); Henry Heide, Inc. v. George Ziegler Co., 354 F.2d 574, 576
(7th Cir. 1965); Information Clearing House, Inc. v. Find Magazine, 492 F.
Supp. 147, 155 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Leon Finker, Inc. v. Schlussel, 469 F.
Supp. 674, 678 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 204 U.S.P.Q. 433 (2d Cir. 1979) (calling the
doctrine "established law"); Carcione v. Greengrocer, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1075,
1077 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Park &Fly, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 422,425
(D. Mass 1979); Trak, Inc. v. Banner Ski KG, 475 F. Supp. 1076, 1078 (D. Mass
1979); Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 1055, 1058-59
(N.D.N.Y. 1978); Anvil Brand, Inc. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 464 F. Supp.
474, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451
F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. v.
Better Business Bureau, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. 282, 290 (S.D. Fla. 1978). Compare Treece &Stephenson, Another Look At DescriptiveAnd Generic Terms

In American Trademark Law, 66 TMR 452, 457-58, 474-78 (1966) ("common
law courts have not yet given currency to the phrase 'de facto secondary

meaning") with Zivin, Understanding Generic Words, 63 TMR 173, 175-76

(1963).
106. This is the doctrine that "functional features are not entitled to

trademark protection ...

even if those features ...

identify the source of

the product." Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (D.
Hawaii 1979), affid mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981). Accord Upjohn Co. v.
Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio
Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), affd per curiam, 470 F.2d
975 (6th Cir. 1972). See also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979). Cf. Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1980).
107. Indeed, it may be that there is no such thing as a "pure" trademark
or generic term. Rather, many, if not all, word and name marks may have
some generic significance, just as generic terms may indicate source to
some portion of the consuming public. See, e.g., E. L DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 526 n.54 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), where
consumers were asked whether certain "names" were trademarks
("brand") or generic terms ("common") with the following results:
DON'T KNOW
COMMON
BRAND
NAME
STP
THERMOS
MARGARINE
TEFLON
JELLO

REFRIGERATOR

90
51
9
68
75

6

5
46
91
31
25

94

5
3
1
2
1

-

86
13
ASPIRIN
24
76
COKE
See also Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296,
301-03 (9th Cir. 1979); Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1979); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v.
Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963) ("Since... the primary
significance to the public of the word 'thermos' is its indication of the nature
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designations, a trademark might well be defined as any word,
name, symbol or device or combination thereof that (1) identifies the goods of one party and distinguishes them from those of
others and (2) to which others have no legally cognizable claim.
Competitive Implications of the Definition of a Trademark

More than a definition is called into question by recognizing
the existence of designations in the second category. 10 9 At issue
is the operation of words, names, symbols and devices in a competitive marketplace. Specifically, the existence of designations
of the second type upsets the traditional balance between procompetitive trademarks" 0 and anticompetitive generic terms or
functional features.11 ' If some, but not all, designations exhibit
the characteristics of each, it becomes logical to ask where a line
ought to be drawn in the interests of furthering competition.
and class of an article rather than as an indication of its source, whatever
duality of meaning the word still holds for a minority of the public is of little
consequence except as a consideration in the framing of a decree.") and
cases cited therein; Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251,
255-56 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); Loctite Corp. v. National Starch & Chemical Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 199-200 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448,451-52
(N.D. Cal. 1981); Carcione v. Greengrocer, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1075, 1077 (E.D.
Cal. 1979); Salton, Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F. Supp. 477 F. Supp. 975, 986
(D.N.J. 1979); Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. v. Better Business
Bureau, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. 282, 290 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Dictaphone Corp. v.
Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 490 (D. Ore. 1978); Stix Prods., Inc. v.
United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf.
Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920). See Folsom & Tepley,
Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YAE L.J. 1323, 1339-40 (1980); Swann, The
Validity of Dual FunctioningTrademarks: Genericism Tested By Consumer
UnderstandingRather Than By Consumer Use, 69 TMR 357 (1979).
108. That many symbols and devices have a dual significance is evident
from cases such as Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d
Cir. 1981); International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633
F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.LW. 3931 (U.S. June 15,
1981); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 602 F.2d
200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979) ("We do not agree that ... because an item is in part
incidentally functional, it is necessarily precluded from being designated as
a trademark."); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp.,
472 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D. Hawaii 1979), affd, 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); RollsRoyce Motors Ltd. v. A&A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692 (N.D. Ga.
1976); Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 4422 F. Supp. 905, 914 (D.N.J.
1976); PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry Sales Reps., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
110. See supra text accompanying note 43.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
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De Facto Secondary Meaning
The defacto secondary meaning doctrine provides that a generic term or functional feature can never serve as a valid trademark. 112 The purpose underlying this rule is that exclusive
appropriation of such designations would prohibit others from
describing their "goods as what they are" 113 or making, using or
114
selling goods with functional features.
As such, the defacto secondary meaning doctrine amounts
to a judgment that the trademark, or pro-competitive significance of a designation is always outweighed by the anticompetitive effect of permitting exclusive appropriation. That the
it
doctrine is not seen for what it is, however, is as evident where116
has been applied 15 as where it might have been, but was not.
Two recent decisions illustrate the failure to consider the
competitive balance between trademark and generic significance in determining the status of words and names. In Miller
Brewing Co. v. FalstaffBrewing Corp. ,117 plaintiff relied on Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 1 8 to assert rights in LITE for beer.
In rejecting this claim, the court fell back on the defacto secondary meaning doctrine: "Under no circumstances is a generic
term susceptible of de jure protection under § 43(a) of the Lan119
ham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) ....
The court in Metric & MultistandardComponents Corp. v.
Metric's, Inc.,120 was asked to decide whether Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act entitled plaintiff to enjoin another's use of
112. See cases cited supra notes 105-06.
113. CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13
(2d Cir. 1975). Accord cases cited supra note 105.
114. See cases cited supra note 106.
115. See cases cited supra notes 105-06. In these cases the courts apply
the defacto secondary meaning doctrine without regard to its competition
implications. Further evidence of the uncritical attitude toward the defacto
secondary meaning doctrine may be found in those cases which apply it
after stating that the primary significance of a word, name, symbol or device
ought to determine its legal status. See also cases cited infra notes 105 and
107, or infra notes 106 and 108.
116. Metric &Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d
710, 714 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Dawn Assoc. v. Links, 203 U.S.P.Q. 831, 836
(N.D. Ill. 1978).
117. 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981).
118. See supra note 21. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant's use of FALSTAFF LITE BEER amounted to unfair competition.
119. Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 655 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.
1981) (footnote omitted). In reaching this result, the First Circuit reversed
the district court decision, and effectively rejected the generally excellent
discussion by the lower court. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896 (D.R.I. 1980), discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 134-36.
120. 635 F.2d.710 (8th Cir. 1980).
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METRIC for various fixtures, tools and other industrial supplies
despite a claim that METRIC was a generic term. Without regard for the competitive implications of its decision, the court
answered the question in the affirmative, stating:
Regardless of whether its mark is [generic] .... the plaintiff may
show that its mark is 'so associated with its goods that the use of
the same or similar marks by another company constitutes
a repre'12 1
sentation that its goods come from the same source.
In Miller Brewing Co. v. FalstaffBrewing Corp., the court
simply assumed that the proven capacity of LITE to identify
source, and thereby further competition, was outweighed by the
need to permit other brevwers to use "lite" or "light." Indeed,
there is a strong suggestion in the opinion that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit would have looked askance at an attempt to strike a proper competitive balance between the
trademark and generic significance of a word or name. 122 The
Metric case amounts to a defacto generic meaning doctrine: no
amount of evidence of generic character can prevent the exclusive appropriation of a term that has acquired secondary
meaning.
The de facto secondary meaning doctrine may, at first
glance, have more appeal when applied to symbols and devices
than to words and names. Where a product cannot be made,
used or sold, or at least not made, used or sold as readily, without a feature, exclusive appropriation by one source of the product is, perhaps obviously, inappropriate. However, the law of
functionality is not confined to symbols and devices. 12 3 Moreover, whether applied to symbols and devices, or to words and
names, in cases of functionality, the defacto secondary meaning
doctrine fails to balance the procompetitive and anticompetitive
significance of designations. 124 In this respect its application
121. Id. at 714. The case quoted by the court, Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany
Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1956), concerns only valid trademarks that are not registered. It provides no support for the proposition
that an unregistrable generic term is entitled to protection under § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. Given defendant's failure to show that METRIC was a generic term, the statement in the Metric case may well be regarded as
dictum.
122. [TIhe evidence before the district court showed, at best, merely
that in the last half decade the public perception of Miller as the source
of 'LITE' has increased and become dominant in the public mind. However, evidence to that effect is irrelevant ....
There was no evidence
that as of today 'LITE' has ceased to have in current usage among consumers of beer the generic meaning, 'beer of low caloric content.' (citations omitted) (original emphasis)
Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 655 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1981).

123. See certain cases cited supra note 45.
124. See supra note 115.
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parallels the treatment of words and names with generic
significance.
The PrimarySignificance Test

Somewhat more satisfactory than the de facto secondary
125 of
meaning doctrine, as a measure of the dual significance
words, names, symbols and devices, is the primary significance
test. Even this test is not without flaws.
Generic Terms
Learned Hand is widely credited with getting to the heart of
the issue of generic character; he stated that the "single question ...

is merely one of fact: what do the buyers understand

by the word for whose use the parties are contending?"'12 6 Seventeen years later in Kellogg 2 7 the Supreme Court added 128
that buyer understanding is the belief of a majority of the public: "[T~o establish a trade name ... the plaintiff[ 1 29 ] must
show... that the primary significance of the term in the minds
of the consuming public is not the product but the producer."' 30
Since Kellogg, the primary significance test and associated
focus upon the percentage of consumers who must recognize
the trademark or generic significance of a word or name has be125. See cases cited supra notes 107-08.
126. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (2d Cir. 1921). See Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d 1011,
1016 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[In making the sometimes elusive determination of
genericness courts have consistently followed the test stated by Judge
Learned Hand in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y.
1921)").
127. 305 U.S. 111 (1938). See supra text accompanying notes 73-84.
128. Hand said "the question is whether the buyers merely understood
that the word 'Aspirin' meant this kind of drug, or whether it meant that
and more than that, i.e., that it came from the same single, though, if one
please anonymous, source from which they had got it before." Bayer Co. v.
United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (emphasis added).
129. That plaintiff ought to bear the burden of proof seems to be an assumption the Supreme Court made, without considering the issue. At least
where a mark is registered, it appears that defendant ought to bear the burden of establishing genericness as an affirmative defense. See Reese Publishing Co. v. Hampton Int'l Communications, Inc., 620 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980);
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448,451-52
(N.D. Cal. 198); Decatur Fed. S&L Ass'n v. Peach State Fed. S&L Ass'n, 203
U.S.P.Q. 406, 411 (N.D. Ga. 1978), and cases cited in each; 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1065(4), 1115(b). The same issue arises with respect to functionality.
See, e.g., Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193,
195-96 (1st Cir. 1980), and cases cited therein; Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue

Bell, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. 473, 475 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
130. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (emphasis added).
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come the prevailing standard. 13 1 Problems with the test include
a failure to apply it with an even hand in some cases 132 and a
failure to apply it at all when the de facto secondary meaning
133
doctrine is brought to the courts' attention.
This issue is addressed in Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp.,134 where the court took exception to the defacto
secondary meaning doctrine 135 and concluded:
If the public actually perceives a symbol as representing the product's name, then no one producer will be able to appropriate that
mark to his brand because secondary meaning and likelihood of
confusion cannot be proved. If, however, the public perceives the
symbol as representing the product's origin, should a court refuse
to protect the mark because it believes that the public has mistakenly attached brand significance to what is in truth a common descriptive name? I submit that the 'true' meaning of a symbol can
136 be
nothing more, or less, than what the public thinks it means.
The following principles ought to be kept in mind in discussing the relationship between trademarks and generic terms:
131. See cases cited supra note 107. But see Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff
Brewing Co., 655 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1981); Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F.
Supp. 243, 270 (D. Mass. 1955) ("a defendant alleging invalidity of a trademark for genericness must show that to the consuming public as a whole
the word has lost all its trademark significance") (original emphasis). See
generally Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 445 (D.
Ore. 1978); Palladino, Government Enters The Trademark Arena: The

Formica And ReaLemon Cases, BNA Conference Coursebook 86, 92-94
(1980). Although the relevant universe is generally recognized as being
"buyers" or the "consuming public," other formulations occasionally appear. See, e.g., Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655,
659 (7th Cir. 1965) ("general acceptance by the public").
132. Some cases appear not to recognize that the issue is whether a word
or name is primarily a trademark, or primarily a generic term. Instead,
they suggest that the question is whether a word or name is primarily a
trademark, or simply a generic term. See, e.g., Surgicenters of America,
Inc., v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1979).
133. See supra note 115. This amounts to a judgment that the status of a
word or name turns on its primary meaning to consumers, unless the word
or name is generic, in which case it cannot be a trademark irrespective of
actual consumer understanding.
134. 503 F. Supp. 896 (D. R.I. 1980), rev'd, 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981). See
supra note 119.
135. Id. at 906-07.
136. Id. at 907 (original emphasis). Unfortunately, the court's discussion
broke down when it came to define the relationship between a trademark
and a generic term, and characterized the latter as a term wholly lacking in
source significance:
I view 'genericness' and 'secondary meaning' as opposite sides of the
same coin. A word is generic if it has no secondary meaning; conversely, if 'the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer,' then the word is not
generic. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. at 118. Id. at 907-08
(emphasis added).
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1. Properly understood, the primary significance test is a
two-edged sword: if the primary meaning of a word or name is
source, it is a valid trademark; if the primary meaning is a product, the word or name is generic. 137 The defacto secondary doctrine distorts this test by characterizing certain words or names
as generic terms, irrespective of the extent to which the word or
name identifies source.
2. The primary significance test amounts to a judgment
that the competitive value of a trademark as an indicator of
source always equals the anticompetitive effect of permitting
the exclusive appropriation of a generic term. 138 This assumption ought to be evaluated in the light of economic realities to
determine whether a simple majority view adequately reflects
139
competitive concerns.
3. If the real issue in generic character is the role of words
and names in a competitive marketplace, 140 it may be that identifying a generic term ought to go beyond simply ascertaining
"what buyers understand by [a] word.' 14 1
Functional Features
In the interest of promoting competition, 142 courts have
stated that a feature which contributes 43 to the utility of a prod137. See cases cited supra note 107, and notes 132-33.
138. Stated differently, this view is that if more people believe a word or
name identifies source than think it is a product name, competition will be
promoted by permitting its exclusive appropriation, and, conversely, that
competition will be restrained by permitting the exclusive appropriation of
a word or name that a majority believes is generic.
139. If Hand's Bayer test, see supra notes 81, 126, makes economic sense,

it nevertheless may be that a primary significance test does not. See infra
text accompanying notes 186-87.
140. See supra text accompanying note 44.

141. See infra text accompanying notes 188-205. Any weaknesses in
Hand's Bayer test are often exacerbated by the methods used to establish
consumer understanding. These include flawed public reaction surveys:
See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448,

453 (N.D. Cal. 1981); circumstantial evidence of possibly dubious value:
Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d 1011,
1015 (9th Cir. 1979); a questionable reliance on precent, American Ass'n for
Adv. of Science v. Hearst Corp., 498 F. Supp. 244, 255 (D.D.C. 1980) ('"The
courts almost uniformly find magazine titles as descriptive rather than generic ...."); and a judicial attitude that generic terms, like pornography,
are something you know when you see them. Compare, e.g., Miller Brewing
Co. v. G. Heilemen Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1977) ('The record
before us ... and facts of which we may take judicial notice ... enable us
to conclude that 'light' is a generic.... term. . .") with Miller Brewing Co.

v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 503 F. Supp. 896, 906 (D.R.I. 1980), rev'd, 655 F.2d 5
(1st Cir. 1981) ("A word or logo should not be branded 'generic' because a
judge decides that it looks generic to him or her.").
142. See supra text accompanying note 45.
143. For an evaluation of the meaning of "contributes", see infra text accompanying notes 147-57.
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uct may not serve as a trademark. Such cases include those in
which a feature contributes to the manufacture or use of a product' 4 and others where a feature is an "important ingredient in
the commercial success of the product ... .
There is considerable disagreement concerning the extent
to which a feature must contribute to the utility of a product to
be considered functional. Kellogg146 and William R. Warner &
Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 14 7 seem to suggest that a feature must be
144. These cases involve features that contribute to manufacture and

use. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938); William R.

Warner &Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531 (1924); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v.
All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980); Truck Equip.
Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 861 (1976); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Windmere Prods., Inc., 433 F. Supp.
710, 738 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Roll-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A&A Fiberglass, Inc., 428
F. Supp. 689, 693-94 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp.,
422 F. Supp. 905, 913 (D.N.J. 1976); Marion Labs., Inc. v. Michigan Pharmacal
Corp., 338 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Mich. 1972); or the cost or quality of a product,
Kellogg, 305 F. Supp. 111, 122 ("The evidence is persuasive that this form is
functional-that the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high
quality lessened if some other form were substituted for the pillowshape."); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 98081 (M.D. Tenn. 1921), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.21d 975 (6th Cir. 1972). See gen-

erally RESTATEMENT

OF TORTS

§ 742 (1938).

145. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952). In
this category are cases that define functionality "in terms of consumer acceptance." Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir.
1981). Accord Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769,
773-74 (9th Cir. 1981); International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg &
Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3981 (U.S. June
15, 1981); Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1360
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (D.
Hawaii 1979), affd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981). Cf. Boston Pro. Hockey
Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & E. Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

423 U.S. 868 (1975).
It is suggested that this category also includes cases where the feature
is said to perform a psychological function. Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1959):
The function of a remedy 'For Upset Stomach' is to quiet the upset.
Hence, although the court found 'that the pink color and the ingredients
producing same have no healing value in themselves,' yet it recognized
that the pink color was 'designed to present a pleasing appearance to
the customer and to the sufferer.' From the court's premise that 'a dis-

ordered stomach will accept that which is pleasing and reject that

which is repulsive,' a finding of functional value might well be made

because a rejected stomach medicine scarcely has a fair opportunity to
fulfill its function.
Id. at 572. Cases of this type include Ives and those cited supra note 4. See
also

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 742 (1938), comment a.

146. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
147. 265 U.S. 526 (1924). See also cases cited supra note 144; Cooper,
supra note 1, at 7-15.
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necessary to the utility of a product to be functional. The Restatement of Torts § 742 provides that a "feature of goods is functional... if it affects their purpose, action or performance, or
the facility or economy of processing, handling or using
them... ."1 Other cases regard as functional any feature that
149
is "important" to commercial success.
Concern over the extent to which a functional feature must
contribute to utility is perhaps most evident in cases that recognize, if only in passing, that a symbol or device may have more
than one meaning.15 0 In these cases, a feature is not considered
functional unless it serves "primarilyas a functional part of the
product."'151 The meaning of "primarily" functional in these
cases is far from clear. Some formulations indicate that features
are not primarily functional if they are only "incidentally functional", 152 "serve secondarily as trademarks", 153 have only
"some practical purpose",1M or "improve ... the usefulness or
appeal of the object .... ,95 Among the more confusing cases is

Famolare,Inc. v. Melville Corp.,156 which contrasts a functional
feature with a symbol or device that serves "merely" to distin5 7
guish and "primarily to identify."'
148. Emphasis added. See also comment a (A feature "may be functional ...because it contributes to their utility, to their durability or to the
effectiveness or ease with which they serve their function or are handled by
users.").
149. See cases cited supra note 145, including Famolare, Inc. v. Melville
Corp., 472 F. Supp. 728, 743 (D. Hawaii 1979), affd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.
1981) ("A feature which gives the consumer a substantial reason for
purchasing the product.., is functional.").
150. See supra note 108, including International Order of Job's Daughters
v. Lindeburg &Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
2931 (June 15, 1981) ("Our holding does not mean that [an] . . .emblem

could not serve simultaneously as a functional component of a product and
a trademark. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979).").
151. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912,917 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3931 (June 15, 1981) (emphasis added). Accord cases supra note 108.
152. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536
F.2d 1210, 1219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Fotomat Corp. v.
Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (D. Kan. 1977).
153. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg &Co., 633 F.2d
912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3931 (U.S. June 15, 1981).
154. Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689,
692 (N.D. Ga. 1976). See also Time Mecanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F.
Supp. 905, 914 (D.N.J. 1976) ("some utilitarian function").
155. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774
(9th Cir. 1981).
156. 472 F. Supp. 738 (D. Hawaii 1979), affd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9 Cir. 1981).
157. Id. at 743. See also PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry Sales Reps., Inc., 392 F.
Supp. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), which suggests that a feature must be a
"mere indicia of origin" to serve as a trademark, but is functional if a "po-
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Although any of these formulations may be regarded as an
58
improvement over the de facto secondary meaning doctrine,
confusion remains. The confusion follows from a failure to consider properly the competitive implications of permitting a product feature to be appropriated by a single source of goods. If the
advantages of appropriation outweigh the disadvantages, the
feature ought to be considered a trademark; if the balance tips
in the opposite direction, the feature ought to be regarded as
functional. 5 9 How far the scales should tilt in either direction
symbols and devices
can best be determined by evaluating6how
0
marketplace.
the
in
function
actually
TrademarksAnd Competition
Efforts ought to be made to gain a more complete understanding of the role trademarks play in a competitive marketplace. The market dynamics of trademark are not much better
understood now than they were when the trademark was first
defined, 16 ' partially because of the current state of the law.
PresentLevel Of Understanding
The traditional balance between valid trademarks and generic terms or functional features' 62 has been struck largely
without resort to economic analysis of the marketplace. Trademarks are considered procompetitive-indeed, the "essence of
competition"16 3-simply because they identify one source of
goods.' 64 Congress found support for this view in judicial opinion,16 5 including Justice Frankfurter's memorable, but undocumented dictum in Mishawaka Manufacturing Co. v. Kresge
tential buyer ... [is] more motivated by the item's design and aesthetic
features than by its source" (emphasis added). Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1981) indicates that a feature is not
functional if it is either "essential to the utility of the item" or "not significantly related to the utilitarian function of the product."
158. The improvement lies in the recognition of the dual significance of
symbols and devices, and the need to establish a balance between the procompetitive and anti-competitive characteristics that they exhibit.
159. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 826 (3d Cir.
1981) (feature functional because "on balance the interest in free competition in the luminaire market outweighed Keene's interest in having the exclusive right to the design of the Wall Cube.").
160. See infra text accompanying notes 186-205.
161. See authorities cited supra note 38. For authorities considering the
historical development of trademarks, see Palladino, supra note 43, at 469
n.59.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
163. See supra quote accompanying note 43.
164. See authorities cited supra note 43.
165. See supra note 43.
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Co. 1 66 concerning the "psychological function of symbols."' 167
The character of generic terms 168 and functional features 169 is
said to follow from the anticompetitive effect of permitting their
exclusive appropriation.
This approach, divorced from economic analysis, has long
been something of an article of faith with courts and those who
practice before them. And, not unlike other doctrinaire beliefs,
it has created dogma from enthusiasm, by focusing on whether
words, names, symbols and devices represent the essence of
competition or embody the evils of monopoly. 170 That they do
neither is probably closer to the truth.
Several recent developments in the law have brought economic theory to bear on the traditional concern with trademarks
and competition. In a case concerning the REALEMON trade72
mark,' 7 1 and another involving the breakfast cereal industry,
166. 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
167. Id.

The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is
no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he
wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a
mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to
convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value.
Id. at 205.
168. See supra text accompanying note 44.
169. See supra text accompanying note 45.
170. The debate concerning the operation of valid trademarks, should be
distinguished from the balance the law has traditionally struck between
valid trademarks and generic terms or functional features. See supra text
accompanying notes 43-45.
171. On August 19, 1976, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) handed
down an Initial Decision in FTC v. Borden, Inc., No. 8978. See [Transfer
Binder 1976-79] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,194 (1976). In that decision,
the ALJ concluded that Borden had monopolized the market in processed

lemon juice; that the "heart of the monopoly power preserved and maintained by respondent Borden lies in the ReaLemon trademark and its dominant market position. For competition to enter the processed lemon juice
industry, the barrier to entry which inheres in the ReaLemon trademark
must be eliminated." (Id. at p. 21,107); and that the REALEMON trademark
should be licensed "for a period of ten (10) years from the date of this order
... [to anyone] desiring to enter the business of producing and marketing
processed lemon juice ... ." 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 21,194 at p. 21,108.

Borden appealed. In an order dated November 7, 1978, the FTC enjoined Borden from granting price reductions, selling below cost or at un-

reasonably low prices, and granting promotional allowances. Concerning
the compulsory trademark licensing remedy, the majority FrC opinion
stated that whereas "an order requiring licensing or suspension of a trademark may be ordered as a means of dissipating illegally used or acquired
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economic analyses played a part in determining whether a valid
trademark promotes or restrains competition. 173 Of more imme174
diate interest is a case involving the FORMICA trademark,
monopoly power,. . given the competitive climate in the processed lemon
juice market, we are not persuaded that a restriction on trademark rights is
needed to curb the unlawfully maintained monopoly" In re Borden, 92
F.T.C. 669, 808-09 (FTC 1978). (citations and footnotes omitted). In a separate opinion, Chairman Pertschuk concluded that compulsory trademark licensing was an appropriate remedy, warranted in the case of REALEMON.
Legal commentators focused a good deal of attention on the case. Com-

pare Ball, Government Versus Trademarks: Today-Pharmaceuticals,Real
Lemon and Formica-Tommorrow?,68 TMR 471 (1978); Dobb, Compulsory
Trademark Licensure As A Remedy ForMonopolization, 26 CATH.U.L. REV.
589 (1977); Kemp, In re Borden: The FTC Goes Sour on Trademarks, 35 Bus.
LAw. 501 (1980); McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing Of A Trademark: Remedy or Penalty, 67 TVIR 197 (1977); McCarthy, Trademarks, Antitrust And
The Federal Trade Commission, 13 J. MAR.L. REV. 151 (1979); Palladino,

supra note 43, at 457; Palladino, supra note 131, with Drebin, Abuse Of

Trademarks: A Proposal For Compulsory Licensing, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
644 (1973); Scherer, The PosnerianHarvest: Separating Wheat From Chaff,

86 YALE L.J. 974, 998-1001 (1977). Representative articles from non-legal
publications are collected at Palladino, supra, note 131, at 110-11.
172. In re Borden was a test case for the so-called "Cereal Case," Kellogg
Co., No. 8883 (FTC, ified April 26, 1972), where compulsory trademark licensing was proposed as a remedy to combat an alleged shared monopoly
in the breakfast cereal market. See Palladino, supra note 43, at 458-60 n.1516. On September 1, 1981, the ALJ in Kellogg Co. handed down a 266-page
opinion dismissing the complaint. See "Reagan's Antitrust Explosion," N.Y.
Times, January 10, 1982, § 3 at p. 1; "Snap, Crackle, Flop!," TIME, January 25,
1982 at p. 58.
173. See Craswell, Trademarks, Consumer Information, And Barriersto

Competition, Policy Planning Issues Paper (1979), and supra note 171.
174. On May 31, 1978, the FTC fied a petition with the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TrAB) to cancel the registration of FORMICA on the
ground that the trademark had become the common descriptive name of an
article. See supra note 44. Formica Corporation's parent, American Cyanamid Company, cancelled a registration obtained in 1963 under the Lanham
Act and elected to retain a registration granted under the Trademark Act of
1905. See FTC v. Elder Mfg. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. 429, 430 (Comm. Pat. 1950).
Formica Corporation then moved to dismiss the FTC's petition on the
ground that the FTC lacked power to cancel a registration granted under
the Trademark Act of 1905 and republished under § 12(c) of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1062(c) (1976).
The ITrAB denied Formica's motion to dismiss. FTC v. Formica Corp.,
200 U.S.P.Q. 182 (TTAB 1978), and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) denied Formica's petition for mandamus and prohibition. Formica
Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 590 F.2d 915, 922 (CCPA 1979). Thereafter, Formica fied
a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, which was denied. Formica Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). On May 5, 1980, after learning of legislation intended to withdraw funding for FTC petitions to cancel registrations, see
FTC Improvements Act of 1980 § 18, the FTC moved to dismiss the proceeding without prejudice. In an unreported decision dated June 13, 1980, the
TTAB denied the motion and dismissed the proceeding with prejudice. See
TTAB Rule 2.114(c).
Legal commentators focused a good deal of attention on the case. Compare Ball, supra note 171; Fietkiewicz, Section 4 of the Lanham Act-FTC
Authority to Challenge Generic Trademarks,48 FoRDHAM L, REV. 437 (1980)

[hereinafter cited as Fietkiewicz]; Palladino, supra note 131; Shipley, Ge-
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which spawned new proposals for testing generic character. 175
The disposition of all these cases 176 may suggest that economic analysis of the role of trademarks remains an idea whose
time has not come; indeed, at least one commentator has advocated caution in moving too far from tradition.1 77 However
sound this advice may be, given the presently inadequate understanding of how designations operate in a competitive marketplace, 178 and given problems with existing law, 17 9 new
approaches ought to be explored.
1

L

Current State Of The Law
The law's present treatment of generic terms and functional
features amounts to a distinction between words and names on
the one hand and symbols and devices on the other. 80 One resneric Trademarks,the FTC and the Lanham Act: Covering the Market with
Formica, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1978); Swann, supra note 107; Swann,
The Economic Approach to Genericism A Reply to Folsom and Tepley, 70
TMR 243 (1980) with Dixon, Trademarks, The Federal Trade Commission
and the Lanham Act, 68 TMR 463 (1978); Dougherty, FederalTrade Commission v. Formica: The Generic Trademark Issue, 2 COMM. AND THE LAW

(1980) [hereinafter cited as Dougherty]; Folsom &Teply, supra note 107, at
1323.
175. Comparesupra text and accompanying notes 126-31 with Dougherty
supra note 174, at 15 where the following are listed among the criteria relied
on by the FTC:
4. price premium for the trademarked product
5. performance characteristics of the product not evident from visual
inspection
6. trademark holder in the leading market position
7. role of the mark in question as an apparent barrier to entry or hindrance to effective competition
8. significant market size
12. low likelihood of near-term market correction....
See also Fietkiewicz, supra note 174, at 465-70; Folsom &Teply, supra note
107, at 1347-54; Swann, supra note 174; Swann, supra note 107.
It is suggested that the FTC criteria are not neutral. On the contrary,
they lead to a finding of genericness largely divorced from the role a word,
name, symbol or device plays in the marketplace: (1) the market for a product evidences a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) the leading product in
that market is sold under a trademark; (3) the trademark is therefore generic. Cf infra text and accompanying notes 198-201.
176. See supra notes 171-72, 174.
177. See Swann, supra note 174, at 243.

178. See supra note 43, and articles cited supra notes 171, 173-74.
179. See text accompanying notes 115-24, 132-36, 146-57. Cf. Swann, Economic Implications Of Genericism, GENERIc TRADEMARKS 245 (PUi 1981);

Folsom &Tepley, supra note 174, at 1347 ("Because the current substantive
law of genericness does not incorporate... economic considerations.

.

., it

fails to apply appropriate substantive rules to generic-trademark cases.")
180. Compare supra text accompanying notes 126-31, with text accompanying notes 143-45. See Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 461 F.
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olution of this conflict lies within the framework of existing law:
evaluate all designations as if they were either (1) words or
names or (2) symbols or devices.
In the first case, the status of a designation would be determined by applying the traditional test for a generic term. 181
Whenever the status of a word, name, symbol or device was at
issue, the question would be: "[Wihat do the buyers understand"'8 2 by the designation? If it seems difficult to relate this
question to a symbol or device, including a product feature, it
may be remembered that the search is for those designations
183
that primarily identify source to the consumer.
In the second case, the status of a designation would turn on
the standard for determining whether a product feature is functional.' 8 4 In that situation, it would be necessary to establish
(1) whether a word or name contributed to the commercial success of a product and (2) if it did not, whether it was
distinctive. 185

Supp. 1055, 1059-60 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). An exception is the defacto secondary
meaning doctrine, which is a part of the law of both genericness and
functionality.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 126-31.
182. That this is not an entirely unreasonable inquiry may be seen by
comparing Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921),
where the test was first formulated in connection with the name of a drug
("aspirin"), with Ives and other drug cases collected supra note 4, where
the claimed trademark is the appearance of a capsule and an issue is the
meaning of that appearance to consumers.
183. Something akin to this approach may be found in the cases cited
supra note 145. That the question raised in those cases differs from Hand's
Bayer formulation is evident from the need to show that the appearance of
the product feature (1) possesses secondary meaning and (2) is non-functional. Answering Hand's single question would determine the status of the
product feature. See also Levi Strauss &Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q.
473, 477 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (whether pocket tab for shirts "has become
generic").
184. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
185. This is precisely the approach taken in International Order of Job's
Daughters v. Lindeburg &Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
49 U.SL.W. 3931 (U.S. June 15, 1981), where one of the "features" at issue
was the name JOB'S DAUGHTERS ("Our holding does not mean that a
name or emblem could not serve simultaneously as a functional component of a product and a trademark"; citation omitted; emphasis added);
Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), where the "feature" at issue was the name DAMN I'M GOOD. See
also Vuitton et. Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("LV" for luggage and handbags). Cf. Trak, Inc. v. Banner Ski
KG, 475 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (D. Mass. 1979).
Defendants have introduced some insubstantial issues into the
case, which we will treat summarly ....

[D]efendants continue to cite and discuss cases
protection accorded functional configurations. The
functional trademark is not registrable is confined to
Carthy, supra, Vol. 1, § 7:26. The plaintiff is not using

dealing with the
principle that a
shapes. See, Mca shape, and the

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 15:319

An alternative resolution of the conflict between existing
tests for generic terms and functional feature lies in recognizing
that neither test fully reflects the role played by words, names,
symbols or devices in a competitive marketplace. Among the
many variables that may bear on this role are:
1. Identity of Consumers. To the extent that consumer
perceptions are relevant to the status of designations, 186 the
identity of consumers may be significant. For example, consumer understanding of the meaning of a designation may turn
in part on the consumer's familiarity with a product, which may
in turn depend on frequency of purchase and use and the extent
of exposure to advertising. In evaluating the competitive role of
designations, it may be reasonable to treat the opinions of some
187
consumers differently from the opinions of others.
2. Differences among Trademarks. It may be that different
types of trademarks play different roles in a competitive marketdefendants' argument that the term 'fishscale' is somehow equivalent
to a shape is without legal basis.
186. Consumer perceptions are recognized as being relevant to the issues of generic character, see supra text accompanying notes 126-31, and
functionality. See cases cited supra note 145.
187. For example, assume that one class of consumers (women) makes
more purchases (75%) of a product ("P") than another class (men), who
buy 25% of "P". Assume further that a survey of an equal number of men
and women concerning the meaning of a word ("X") establishes that more
consumers believe that "X" is the generic term for "P" than believe it is a
trademark:
TERM
TRADEMARK
GENERIC

X

35%

65%

but that more women believe "X" is a trademark than believe it is a generic
term:
TERM
RESPONDENT
TRADEMARK
GENERIC
X
Women
70%
30%
X

Men

0%

100%

Under these circumstances it might well be concluded that all those
who make "P" in competition with the maker of "X"ought to be free to use
"X" as a generic term because consumers recognize "X" primarily as a generic term for "P". Alternatively, it could be recognized that competition in
"P" would be enhanced by permitting the maker of "X" to retain the exclusive right to use "X", which is recognized as a trademark by women who
purchase "P" most frequently.
The latter approach amounts to a definition of the status of a word
("X") as consumption rate ("C") times trademark significance ("TS") or
generic significance ("GS"). In the foregoing example, "X" would be a
trademark ("T"):
C
x TS =
T
(75%) x (70%) = 52.5%

(25%) x (0%) = 0.0.

52.5%
not a generic term ("G"):
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place. Indeed, unless the distinction between generic terms and
functional features is merely the product of faulty reasoning by
courts and commentators, it is some evidence that differences
among types of designations can exist. Another variable within
this category might be the number of products with which a
188
designation is associated.
3. Differences Between Trademarks and Service Marks. 189
Although words and names may be generic' 90 and symbols and
devices functional' 9 1 when used in connection with services, it is
C
x GS = G
(75%) x ( 30%) = 22.5%
(25%) x (100%) = 25.0%
47.5%
For discussions of the relevant consumer market, see Loctite Corp. v.
National Starch &Chemical Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 200 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 445 (D. Ore. 1978),
and cases cited therein; Folsom &Tepley, supra note 174, at 1347-50. Bayer
Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), contains two somewhat
inconsistent statements concerning this issue. In one part of his opinion,
Hand stated that the issue is the meaning of a word to "the general consuming public, composed of all sorts of buyers.. . ." Id. at 510. Nevertheless, in
fashioning relief he recognized that the same word meant different things to
the public and to pharmacists. Id. at 515.
188. Most courts hold that the status of a word or name may differ from

product to product. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Heracus Engelhard Vacuum,
Inc., 395 F.2d 457, 464-65 (3d Cir. 1968); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc.,
208 U.S.P.Q. 473, 477 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("There is no rule of law that a

trademark used on a number of different products cannot become generic
as to one of them.") (citations omitted); Anvil Brand, Inc. v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 464 F. Supp. 474, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Riverbank

Labs. v. Hardwood Prods. Corp., 165 F. Supp. 747, 764 (N.D. Ill. 1958). Other
courts have indicated that use of a word or name on more than one product

may reduce the likelihood that it is a generic term for any one of them.
Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903, 906-07 (3d Cir. 1952); Enders
Razor Co. v. Christy Co., 85 F.2d 195, 197-98 (6th Cir. 1936).
189. "The term 'service mark' means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and distinguish them
from the services of others. Titles, character names and other distinctive
features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks
notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the
sponsor." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
190. See Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co.,
601 F.2d 1011, 1015-18 (9th Cir. 1979) (SURGICENTER generic); Council of
Better Business Bureaus, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau, Inc., 200 USPQ
282, 289-93 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU not generic).
See also National Assoc. of Realtors v. Homeowner's Corp. of America, No.
C-81-1656 WAI (N.D. Cal. July 15, 1981) ('The terms 'REALTOR' and 'REALTORS' are distinctive and fanciful terms") Id. at 2.
191. The ability of kiosks to identify the source of photographic development services is considered in Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231,
1235-36 (D. Kan. 1977); Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp.
693, 707 (D.N.J. 1977), and cases cited therein; Fletcher, Buildings As Trademarks, 69 TMR 229 (1979).
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believed that there is currently no discussion of whether the status of such designations ought to turn on their use in connection
on the other in the inwith goods on the one hand and services
192
terests of promoting competition.
4. Cost, Quality, Necessity. Recognizing that the cost,
quality and necessity of goods or services affect purchasing decisions may alter the approach to determining the status of designations. At the very least, it suggests that trademarks are
probably not the "essence of competition"'193 and that the "monopoly phobia"'1 such enthusiasm has helped to engender is
unfounded. More significantly, it may alter judgments as to the
competitive consequences of permitting the exclusive appropriation of designations. 95 That the competitive relationships
among cost, quality and necessity of goods or services and the
role of designations associated with them 196 may be difficult to
articulate supports, at least as persuasively, the need for further
study and may suggest to some that cost, quality and necessity
are irrelevant.
5. Availability and Methods of Purchase. Just as the cost,
quality and necessity of goods or services may be relevant, so
may the availability of goods or services and the way they are
97
purchased. For example, Judge Hand's time-honored test

may make far less economic sense where a major corporation
spends weeks or months negotiating the purchase of an expensive computer than it does when a sixth grader asks for a package of chewing gum over the counter. In the first case, it seems
likely that the status of a claimed trademark will have little
192. That there may be meaningful differences in consumer understanding of trademarks and service marks is suggested by the different definitions of "use" in Section 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. There, a
trademark is used "when it is placed in any manner on the goods or their
containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto," whereas a service mark is created when it iA"used in the sale
or advertising of services ...... (emphasis added).
193. See supra text accompanying note 43.
194. See Pattishall, Trade-marksAnd The Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 967 (1952), and other authorities supra notes 43-45.
195. The consequences of permitting such appropriation lie at the heart
of the law concerning the relationship between trademarks and generic
terms or functional features. See supratext accompanying notes 43-45. The
principles of law that have developed in this area are attempts to deal with
these consequences. A new understanding of how words, names, symbols
and devices operate in the marketplace may result in new principles of law.
196. If the issue is the effect on competition of appropriating designations, evidence of the relative importance of the cost, quality or necessity of
goods or services and the role of designations in the consumer's purchasing
decision may help to determine the competitive effect of permitting the exclusive appropriation of the designation. See supra text accompanying
notes 43-45.
197. See supra quote accompanying notes 81, 126.
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bearing on a purchasing decision. By contrast, competition
might well be impeded if every general request for a type of
product resulted in the sale of one producer's brand of that
product.
6. Identity of Competitors. The degree of successful competition in a commercial field may indicate the extent to which a
designation is necessary to competition.1 98 For example, it was
pointed out in connection with the petition to cancel the registration of FORMICA 199 that the owner of FORMICA had only a
forty percent share of the relevant market, 20 0 and that competitors expressed no interest in being able to use "formica"
20 1
generically.
7. Standing to Sue. 20 2 Closely related to the identity of
competitors is the competitive effect of permitting a non-competitor to challenge the status of a designation used in connec20 3
tion with a product. For example, in the MONOPOLY cases
the declaratory judgment plaintiff, who alleged that MONOPOLY was the generic term for defendant's board game, sold a
different game. 2°4 There was no evidence that anyone wishing
to sell defendant's game-including plaintiff-was prevented
from doing so because it could not use "monopoly" generically,
or would begin to do so if permitted to use "monopoly. '20 5
CONCLUSION

Trademark law is almost certain to change after Ives.
Whether the decision resembles Kellogg, which added a needed
dimension to an existing legal standard, or Sears and Compco,
which sowed seeds of confusion in the trademark field, will depend on how the Supreme Court approaches its latest challenge.
It is hoped that articles such as this one may point toward,
198. Cf discussion supra note 175.
199. See supra note 174.
200. See, e.g., Shipley, supra note 174, at 13 n.65.
201. See discussion of "free rider" problem infra note 202.
202. This issue should be distinguished from the so called "free rider"
question: whether there is a disincentive for one party -to mount a private
challenge to the status of a word or name because a finding of genericness
may benefit the challenger's competitors. See Fietkiewicz, supra note 174,
at 461-65; Folsom &Teply, supra note 107, at 1354-58; Palladino, supra note
174, at 117-20, and authorities cited therein.
203. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296
(9th Cir. 1979); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F.
Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
204. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296,
299-300 (9th Cir. 1979).
205. Cf. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d
296, 305-06 (9th Cir. 1979).
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rather than away from, reason and certainty in the law. It is
urged that other studies be undertaken to establish more clearly
the relationship between trademarks and competition.

